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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Glodowski appeals from his judgment of conviction for failure to update registration
information. He submits this Reply Brief to clarify the facts that were known to the district court
at the time it considered the State’s motion in limine and to respond to the State’s legal
argument.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Glodowski included a statement of facts and course of his proceedings in his
Appellant’s Brief. (Appellant’s Br., pp.1-2.) He cited to the transcript of the motion in limine
hearing, the trial transcript, the exhibits introduced by the State at trial, and the Clerk’s Record.
(See id.) The State includes a statement of facts and course of proceedings in its Respondent’s
Brief, citing to the Presentence Investigation Report for all the factual assertions. (Respondent’s
Br., pp.1-2.) The Presentence Investigation Report was filed with the district court on June 5,
2017, in advance of sentencing on June 12, 2017.

(PSI, p.18; R., p.107.)

The State

acknowledges in its brief that the facts underlying Mr. Glodowski’s criminal conviction in
Wisconsin were “perhaps not available to the district court on the motion in limine . . . .”
(Respondent’s Br., p.7.) This is an extremely significant qualification. At the time of the
hearing on the State’s motion in limine, the district court had absolutely no information
regarding the circumstances surrounding Mr. Glodowski’s conviction in Wisconsin.

(See

Motion Tr., p.20, Ls.6-8, p.21, Ls.2-7.) The facts surrounding this conviction, as set forth in
Respondent’s Brief, were not known to the district court prior to the filing of the Presentence
Investigation Report.
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The State asserts in its Respondent’s Brief that officers learned in June 2017 that
Mr. Glodowski had moved “months earlier.” (Respondent’s Br., p.2.) The State took this
information directly from the PSI. (See PSI, p.20.) But the date is incorrect. Mr. Glodowski
was contacted by a detective with the Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office by telephone on June 7,
2016, and acknowledged he had moved in April 2016. (Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.8-17.) Immediately
after that phone call, Mr. Glodowski went in person to the Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office to
update his address. (Trial Tr., p.103, L.23 – p.24, L.5; State’s Ex. 4.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in concluding the crime of third degree sexual assault as defined
in Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225(3) is substantially equivalent to either rape, as defined in
Idaho Code § 18-6101, or lewd conduct with minor child under sixteen, as defined in
Idaho Code § 18-1508?

II.

Did the district court commit fundamental error when it failed to instruct the jury
regarding the knowledge element of the offense?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Concluding The Crime Of Third Degree Sexual Assault As Defined
In Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225(3) Is Substantially Equivalent To Either Rape, As Defined In Idaho
Code § 18-6101, Or Lewd Conduct With Minor Child Under Sixteen, As Defined In Idaho
Code § 18-1508
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine asking the district court to rule, as a matter
of law, that the Wisconsin statute Mr. Glodowski was convicted of violating (Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 940.225(3)), is substantially equivalent to Idaho Code § 18-6101 or § 18-1508. (See
Appellant’s Br., p.2, note 1.) The district court granted the State’s motion, concluding the
Wisconsin crime of third degree sexual assault as set forth in Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225(3) is
substantially equivalent to either rape as set forth in Idaho Code § 18-6101 or lewd conduct with
minor child under sixteen as set forth in Idaho Code § 18-1508. (Motion Tr., p.28, L.21 – p.29,
L.1; R., pp.52-53.) Mr. Glodowski argued in his Appellant’s Brief that the district court erred in
granting the State’s motion in limine because the Wisconsin crime of third degree sexual assault
includes conduct which is not substantially equivalent to either rape or lewd conduct with a
minor child under sixteen. (Appellant’s Br., pp.4-7.)
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues, for the first time on appeal, that the second
portion of the Wisconsin statute at issue, which prohibits certain types of nonconsensual sexual
contact with an adult, is substantially equivalent to Idaho Code § 18-6605 and § 18-6608.
(Respondent’s Br., p.5.) The State made no reference to these statutes in the district court, and
argued only that the Wisconsin statute is substantially equivalent to § 18-6101 and § 18-1508. 1
(R., pp.52-53; Motion Tr., p.28, L.21 – p.29, L.1.) Appellate court review is limited to the
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evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented below. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez,
162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017); State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017). In State v. Fuller, 163
Idaho 585 (2018), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the State’s alternative argument that a
traffic stop was proper based on reasonable suspicion that the defendant violated Idaho Code
§ 49-630(1) because the State did not present this argument in the district court. Id. at 590. The
Court said, “That section 49-630 was not raised below spells the fatal resolution of this argument
on appeal.” Id. at 591. The same fatal result must apply to the State’s new argument that
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225 is substantially equivalent to either Idaho Code § 18-6605 or § 186608.
The State also argues that the district court correctly concluded the Wisconsin statute is
substantially equivalent to Idaho Code § 18-6101 and § 18-1508 because, in Doe v. State, 158
Idaho 778, 783 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court “rejected the argument that differences related
to the victim’s age were sufficient to overcome the otherwise substantially equivalent nature of
two statutes.” (Respondent’s Br., p.6.) This is not a fair characterization of Doe. In Doe, the
Supreme Court considered whether a Washington statute prohibiting communication with a
minor for immoral purposes was substantially equivalent to Idaho Code § 18-1506(1)(a), which
prohibits a person 18 years of age or older from soliciting a minor child under 16 years to
participate in a sexual act. 158 Idaho at 783. The Court held the two statutes are substantially
equivalent as “[b]oth of these statutes criminalize communicating the desire to participate
intentionally in sexual contact with a child.” Id. The Court said the differing definitions of a
minor (child under 18 in the Washington statute, and child under 16 in the Idaho statute) was not

1

Notably, the jury was instructed, consistent with the district court’s ruling on the State’s motion
in limine, that the crime of third degree sexual assault in Wisconsin “is substantially equivalent
to a violation of Idaho Code section 18-6101 or Idaho Code section 18-1508.” (R., p.94.)
5

significant for the purpose of the substantial equivalency analysis, as it was not relevant to the
case. Id.
Here, the Wisconsin statute at issue does not include, as an element of the offense, a
requirement that the victim be a minor. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.225(5)(b). It is thus not
substantially equivalent to Idaho Code § 18-1508, which makes it a crime to commit “any lewd
or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor child
under the age of sixteen (16) years . . . .” Moreover, at the time the district court considered the
State’s motion in limine, it had no information regarding the nature of Mr. Glodowski’s out-ofstate offense. (See Motion Tr., p.20, Ls.6-8, p.21, Ls.2-7.) Looking at the statutory elements, the
district court erred in concluding the Wisconsin crime of third degree sexual assault is
substantially equivalent to the Idaho crimes of rape or lewd conduct with minor child under
sixteen. As Mr. Glodowski argued in his Appellant’s Brief, the second portion of the Wisconsin
statute prohibits certain types of nonconsensual sexual contact with an adult, which would not be
prohibited in Idaho as either rape or lewd conduct with minor child under sixteen. (Appellant’s
Br., pp.6-7.) The district court thus erred in granting the State’s motion in limine.

II.
The District Court Committed Fundamental Error When It Failed To Instruct The Jury
Regarding The Knowledge Element Of The Offense
Idaho Code § 18-8311 makes it a crime to “knowingly fail[ ] to register, verify . . .
address, or provide any information or notice as required . . . .” I.C. § 18-8311(1).

At

Mr. Glodowski’s trial, the jury was instructed that the State had to prove Mr. Glodowski “failed
to appear in person to notify of changes of his street address or actual address.” (R., p.92.) The
jury was not instructed regarding the knowledge element of the offense. In his Appellant’s Brief,
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Mr. Glodowski argued the district court committed fundamental error when it failed to instruct
the jury regarding the knowledge element of the offense. (Appellant’s Br., pp.7-10.) In its
Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Mr. Glodowski invited the error by requesting the jury
instruction at issue. (Respondent’s Br., p.8.) Mr. Glodowski acknowledges that both parties
requested an instruction which did not include the knowledge element of the offense. (R., pp.5466.) Mr. Glodowski thus acknowledges he is barred from challenging this jury instruction as
fundamental error on direct appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Glodowski respectfully requests that the Court vacate his conviction and remand this case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2018.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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